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INTRODUCTION

Luis Beltran was a maintenance building technician at a nursing
home in New Jersey.2 On March 24, 2020, he performed work in the
room of a resident who soon after tested positive for COVID-19.3
Luis began to feel ill, and the next week, his mother, who cared for his
children while he worked, tested positive for COVID-19.4 Luis was
instructed by his local health department to quarantine for two weeks,
but his employer repeatedly insisted he return to work earlier.5 When
he did not, he was fired.6 Luis sued, asserting his statutory right to
two weeks of emergency paid sick leave under the novel Families
First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).7 His employer argued
that it was entitled to exempt Luis from this leave because “health
care providers” could be excluded under the statute.8 At the time of
his termination, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) erroneously
defined “health care provider” to include people like Luis, who
provided no health care but happened to work for a nursing home.9
Luis was not alone in being excluded from emergency paid sick
leave due to the DOL’s overly-broad emergency rule, which was
promulgated, with Congress’s blessing, without ‘notice and comment’
rulemaking procedures.10 The temporary FFCRA, passed at the
outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, provided some U.S. workers with
two weeks of emergency paid sick leave to quarantine due to
COVID-19 exposure or infection and expanded the Family Medical
Leave Act to allow parents to take unpaid leave due to COVID-19related school closures.11 The federal government subsidized this
leave with tax credits.12 Employers covered by the law could elect to
use the “health care provider” and first responder exception to
exclude their employees from this emergency paid sick leave.13 The
DOL estimated that 9 million health care workers could be excluded

2. Beltran v. 2 Deer Park Drive Operations, LLC, No. 20-8454 (MAS) (LHG),
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37291, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2021).
3. Id. at *2.
4. Id. at *2–3.
5. Id. at *3–4.
6. Id. at *4.
7. See id. at *5.
8. Id. at *14–17.
9. Id.
10. See infra Section I.C.i.
11. See infra Section I.B.ii.
12. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§
7001(a), 7003(a), 134 Stat. 178, 210, 214 (2020).
13. See id. §§ 3105, 5102(a).
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at their employer’s discretion but later admitted that the real figure
might exceed that amount.14 Another conservative estimate found
that 5% of the active workforce, or approximately 8 million health
care workers and emergency responders, were affected.15 Seventyfive percent of health care workers and emergency responders were
women, and 39% were people of color, including Hispanic individuals
and those in non-white racial categories.16
Recognizing that the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated making
sick leave accessible as soon as possible, Congress statutorily
authorized the DOL to bypass notice and comment rulemaking and
promulgate a binding regulation using the good cause exception.17
However, for the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
DOL exceeded its authority under the statute to further limit access
to leave: it promulgated a final rule, inconsistent with the language of
the FFCRA, allowing employers of any health care workers to
exclude all their employees from emergency paid sick leave ––
barring many more workers, like Luis, who were not health care
providers and whom Congress did not intend to exclude.18
In March of 2021, a federal court held that the DOL’s erroneous
definition of “health care provider” should not apply to cases like
Luis’s. Instead, the court found that the statute’s definition of “health
care provider” should be applied and denied the employer’s motion
to dismiss Luis’s claim.19 A few federal courts have begun to correct

14. See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed.
Reg. 19,326, 19,343 (Apr. 6, 2020). An investigation by the DOL’s Office of Inspector
General later found that this estimate “could be understated because it did not
include all the occupations in the Department’s expanded definition for health care
providers.” U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 19-20-009-15-001,
COVID-19: WHD NEEDS TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE PANDEMIC IMPACT ON ITS
OPERATIONS 2–3 (2020).
15. See Michelle Long & Mathew Rae, Gaps in the Emergency Paid Sick Leave
Law for Health Care Workers, KFF (June 17, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronaviruscovid-19/issue-brief/gaps-in-emergency-paid-sick-leave-law-for-health-care-workers/
[https://perma.cc/R44U-GT8E] (defining the health care and emergency response
workforce as individuals who indicated that their job was in the Census code for
pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing; medical equipment and supplies
manufacturing; offices of physicians; outpatient care centers; home health care
services; other health care services; hospitals; nursing care facilities; residential care
facilities without nursing; individual and family services; community food and housing
and emergency services; and justice, public order, and safety activities).
16. See id.
17. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 5111; see also infra Sections
I.A.ii–iii.
18. See infra Section I.C.
19. Beltran v. 2 Deer Park Drive Operations, LLC, No. 20-8454, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37291, at *18–19 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2021).
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the DOL’s error and retroactively restore the right to emergency paid
sick leave to those who were wrongfully denied it during the first six
months of the COVID-19 pandemic.20 This correction –– so far
pursued by only a handful of plaintiffs –– has only been possible
thanks to an activist state Attorney General, receptive federal courts,
and the DOL’s eventual willingness to back down.21 It is impossible
to know how many potential plaintiffs have lost wages and
employment but did not and will not have their pay or employment
restored because they and their employers relied on the erroneous
rule.
In part because the DOL abused its ability to promulgate a rule
using the good cause exception to disregard Congress’s clear
directive, the FFCRA was underinclusive and insufficiently
responsive to an emergency in which millions of workers in the
United States suddenly needed paid sick leave and family leave. If
the DOL had created a rule that was consistent with the FFCRA,
more workers would have received paid sick leave, and fewer people
may have died.22 The purpose of the good cause exception, which
allows agencies to bypass a lengthy notice and comment procedure, is
to provide agencies the flexibility needed to respond to emergencies
quickly.23 The story of the United States’s emergency paid sick leave
experiment demonstrates the serious problems that can arise when
Congress statutorily authorizes an agency to bypass notice and
comment.
While the agency may respond more quickly to
emergencies and insulate itself from legal challenges to its decision to
avoid notice and comment –– arguably good things in an emergency
— the agency may also exceed its authority and promulgate a rule

20. See Simone v. Harborview Rehab. & Care Ctr., No. 20-3551, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 105053, at *8–12 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2021) (following the approach of the courts
in Beltran and Payne and applying the FFCRA’s definition of “health care provider”
to a nursing home maintenance manager); see also Payne v. Woods Servs., Inc., No.
20-4561, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28198, at *13–14 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021) (holding
that the definition of “health care provider” in the FFCRA is the appropriate
definition to apply even though the April Rule was in place at the time of the
Plaintiff’s firing).
21. See generally Simone, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105053, at *8–12; Payne, U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28198, at *13–14. See also infra Sections I.C.ii–iii.
22. While empirical research on the impact of the DOL’s erroneous rule is
lacking, some early studies have shown that people were more likely to stay home
while quarantining when they had access to paid leave under the FFCRA. See infra
text accompanying notes 158–60.
23. See infra Sections I.A.ii–iii and Part II.
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inconsistent with congressional intent.24 When this happens, as it did
when the DOL implemented the FFCRA, Congress itself has no
immediate recourse, and interested parties are unable to formally
share information and evidence with the agency. Assuming a party
has the requisite legal standing and resources to bring a claim in
federal court, the slow and unpredictable nature of the judiciary
makes it an unsuitable primary forum for ensuring agency
accountability in an emergency.25 Thus, the loss of the main vehicle
for public participation in agency rulemaking –– notice and comment
–– deepens the democratic deficit of agencies whose immense power
is delegated by Congress, not derived directly from the people.26
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of notice and
comment rulemaking, the good cause exception under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and statutory authorization to
bypass notice and comment. It also explains how the FFCRA was
passed by Congress and initially implemented by the DOL, and
details how the DOL revised its implementation in response to a
lawsuit by the New York Attorney General and an unfavorable
federal district court ruling. Part II presents arguments for and
against reforming the good cause exception, examines empirical
evidence of the FFCRA’s effectiveness and shortcomings, and offers
alternative emergency rulemaking procedures in existence at the
federal and state levels and alternatives proposed by scholars. Part
III of this Note proposes a framework of procedural safeguards
Congress should stipulate in future emergency legislation where it
statutorily authorizes the use of the good cause exception, including a
mandatory 30-day post-promulgation comment period and expiration
after 90 to 120 days unless the agency promulgates a permanent rule.
I. CASE STUDY: EMERGENCY RULEMAKING AND THE FAMILIES
FIRST CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE ACT

The good cause exception is a long-established, narrowly available
mechanism for agencies to bypass the notice and comment
procedures normally required to create regulations.27 The decision to
invoke the good cause exception under the APA typically lies with

24. See Kevin Hartnett, Jr., Comment, An Approach to Improving Judicial
Review of the APA’s “Good Cause” Exception to Notice-and-Comment
Rulemaking, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 1561, 1576 n.76 (2020).
25. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN.
L. REV. 65, 81 (2015).
26. See infra Section II.A.ii.
27. See infra Sections I.A.i–ii.
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the agency but is subject to judicial review.28 However, following
national crises such as the September 11 terrorist attacks,
environmental disasters, and the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress has
passed emergency legislation authorizing rulemaking without notice
and comment, so that agencies may implement the emergency law
quickly to provide relief.29 The good cause exception and statutory
authorization are two avenues for bypassing notice and comment, but
agencies cite different statutory authority to get there –– the APA, an
emergency statute, or sometimes both.30 Scholars, as well as Congress
itself in authorizing statutes, often use the “good cause exception” to
refer to both the APA and statutory authorization to bypass notice
and comment.31
A recent example of statutory authorization is the FFCRA, a
bipartisan act passed in March 2020 at the outset of the United
States’s COVID-19 pandemic.32 The FFCRA established paid leave
related to the pandemic and authorized the DOL to create
regulations governing this leave without notice and comment.33
However, the DOL created a rule that contradicted the plain
language of the statute, preventing a large but difficult to define
group of U.S. workers from accessing this leave.34 The New York
Attorney General sued the DOL and won in the Southern District of
New York, prompting the DOL to correct the rule six months after its

28. See, e.g., Haw. Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 51 F.3d
212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) use
of the good cause exception to promulgate air safety rules following fatal air tour
accidents); Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1179–80 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(upholding the FAA’s use of the good cause exception to promulgate rules about
airline pilot certification following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks).
29. See infra Section I.A.iii.
30. See infra Section I.A.iii.
31. See infra Section I.A.iii. This Note aims to use “good cause exception” to
refer to the APA, not statutory authorization to bypass notice and comment.
However, the FFCRA’s statutory authorization provision references the APA’s good
cause exception; therefore this Note uses the terms interchangeably in that context.
See infra Section I.B.iv.
32. See infra Section I.B.ii.
33. See infra Section I.B.v.
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 2–3; see
also infra Section I.C. Empirical evidence is lacking on how many non-health care
workers were excluded from accessing leave because of the overly broad April Rule;
the DOL has indicated that using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on the health
care sector underestimates those affected. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 12, at 9.
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creation, and only three months before the FFCRA itself was initially
set to expire.35
A. Administrative Law Background

The APA governs the procedures federal agencies use to fulfill the
policy responsibilities Congress has delegated to them.36 One of the
purposes of the APA is to standardize administrative procedure.37
The two primary tools agencies have at their disposal to implement
statutes are rulemaking, which is quasi-legislative, and adjudication,
which is quasi-judicial.38 Agencies may engage in formal or informal
versions of either, and informal rulemaking and formal adjudication
have long been the most common.39 It is well-settled that the
judiciary will not require agencies to prioritize rulemaking over
adjudication or vice versa.40

i. Notice and Comment Rulemaking
An agency action is a rule if it is a “statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”41 To create a rule, agencies may
engage in informal rulemaking, also known as notice and comment
rulemaking.42 First, the agency must issue a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM), published in the Federal Register, which must
contain a “statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule
making proceedings,” the legal authority for the proposed rule, and a

35. See infra Sections I.C.ii–iii.
36. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59.
37. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950) (“One purpose [of
the APA] was to introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of
administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed
widely from each other.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Supplemental
Appropriation Act, 1951, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048, as recognized in Ardestani v. Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 134 (1991).
38. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–57.
39. Id.; see also William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 40 (1975) (“The two most common types of agency
proceedings, producing orders and rules respectively, are known as formal
adjudication and informal rulemaking.” (citation omitted)).
40. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“[A]n administrative
agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist
upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over
necessity.”).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
42. Id. §§ 553(b)–(c).
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summary of the content of the proposed rule or of the subjects and
issues involved.43
Once notice is issued, the agency must give the public a meaningful
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking by accepting written or
oral comments, data, and arguments.44 The APA does not establish a
uniform minimum comment period, but comment periods for most
rulemakings stay open for at least 30 days.45 The executive branch
has recommended comment periods of at least 60 days.46 While many
agencies state that their policy is to allow comment periods of 60 days
or longer, a 2011 study found that the mean duration is approximately
39 days, and the median duration is 32 days.47 Agencies sometimes
grant extensions to collect more information from interested parties
or improve the quality of responses.48 The agency considers these
submissions, then issues a “concise general statement of . . . basis and
purpose” that responds to vital questions raised by materially cogent
comments.49 However, if the final rule is modified in light of public

43. Id. §§ 553(b)(1)–(3).
44. Id. § 553(c); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d
240, 251 (2d. Cir. 1977) (holding that under 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), the agency should have
disclosed the scientific data they relied upon in creating the proposed rule so that
interested persons would have a meaningful opportunity to respond during the
comment period).
45. See Steven J. Balla, Public Commenting on Federal Agency Regulations:
Research on Current Practices and Recommendations to the Administrative
Conference of the United States 3–6 (Mar. 15, 2011) (unpublished report),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Consolidated-Reports-%2BMemoranda.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y58U-N8AB].
46. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (“[E]ach
agency should afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment on any
proposed regulation, which in most cases should include a comment period of not less
than 60 days.”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011)
(“To the extent feasible and permitted by law, each agency shall afford the public a
meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed
regulation, with a comment period that should generally be at least 60 days.”);
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 86 Fed. Reg.
7,223 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“This memorandum reaffirms the basic principles set forth in
[Executive Order 12866] and in Executive Order 13563 . . . .”).
47. See Balla, supra note 45, at 3–4 (explaining the main arguments for long
comment periods — to give interested parties adequate time to respond to often
sophisticated proposals — and short comment periods — ensuring that rulemaking is
efficient and generates information that will be useful to agency decisionmakers).
48. See id. at 7.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d at 252–53
(“It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by
comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.”).
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comments, it must be a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule.50 A
final rule is a “logical outgrowth” of a proposed rule only if interested
parties could have anticipated that the change was possible, and thus
reasonably should have participated in the comment period.51

ii. The APA’s Good Cause Exception
Unless the enabling statute52 requires notice and comment
rulemaking, the APA allows agencies to elect to bypass this
procedure “when the agency for good cause finds” that using notice
and comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest.”53 The agency must include a brief statement of
its reasoning for finding good cause in the rule issued.54
The decision to use the APA’s good cause exception usually rests
with the agency and may be challenged in federal court.55 The good
cause exception is not meant to be an “‘escape clause’ in the sense
that the agency has discretion to disregard . . . the facts[,]” but is
“narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced” by the
judiciary.56 The Ninth Circuit regards the good cause exception as

50. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3); see also Veterans Just. Grp. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs.,
818 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Where a proposed rule is modified in light of
public comment, the modified rule may be promulgated as a final rule without
additional notice and opportunity for comment, so long as the final rule is a ‘logical
outgrowth’ of the proposed rule . . . . A final rule is a logical outgrowth of a proposed
rule only if interested parties should have anticipated that the change was possible,
and thus reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the
notice-and-comment period.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
51. Veterans Just. Grp., 818 F.3d at 1344; see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd.
v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 167–68, 174–75 (2007) (holding that, unless Congress
specifically tasks the agency with making a rule, withdrawal of a proposed rule is
reasonably foreseeable and therefore a logical outgrowth); Allina Health Servs. v.
Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1108–09 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a final rule that is the
opposite result of the proposed rule is not reasonably foreseeable and is therefore not
a logical outgrowth).
52. Enabling statute has been defined as “a statute that confers (as to an
administrative agency) the power or authority to engage in conduct not previously
allowed.”
Enabling
Statute,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/legal/enabling%20statute [https://perma.cc/H3WF-PBHR] (last visited
Oct. 31, 2021).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
54. Id.
55. See sources cited supra note 28.
56. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(quoting S. DOC. NO.79-248, at 200 (1946)); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The exception excuses notice and comment in
emergency situations, or where delay could result in serious harm.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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“essentially an emergency procedure” because emergencies “are the
most common” situations that justify the exception.57 However,
agencies have increasingly used the good cause exception in recent
decades. From 1995 to 2012, one scholar found that agencies
exempted almost 52% of rules from notice and comment.58 A
Government Accountability Office (GAO) study in 2012 found that
from 2003 to 2010, agencies cited the good cause exception for 61% of
nonmajor rules and 77% of major rules.59 The federal circuit courts
apply different standards when reviewing an agency’s decision to use
the good cause exception, such as arbitrary and capricious or de novo
review.60
While agencies successfully employing the good cause exception
are not required to receive comments, sometimes they invite
comments after the rule has taken effect. This process is called
“interim final rulemaking,” whereby the rule takes effect
immediately, but the agency may choose to revise it based on
comments received post-promulgation.61
The Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS), an independent federal
agency that recommends improvements to administrative process and
procedure, has recommended that agencies receive comments postpromulgation when they invoke the good cause exception because
notice and comment would be “impracticable” or “contrary to the
public interest.”62 ACUS does not recommend a post-promulgation
comment period, however, for rules that address temporary
emergencies or “expire by their own terms within a relatively brief
period,” such as a rule that closes airspace for an air show.63

57. United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
58. Raso, supra note 25, at 91–92 n.125 (noting that the DOL exempted 50.4% of
final rules from notice and comment during the same period).
59. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING:
AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 37
(2012).
60. Compare Sorensen Comm. Ltd. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(applying de novo review), and United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 502 (3d Cir.
2013) (noting that “the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have not stated a standard but
appear to use de novo review” and declining to decide the appropriate standard of
review), with United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 928 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying
arbitrary and capricious review), and United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1278
(11th Cir. 2010) (applying arbitrary and capricious review). See generally Hartnett,
supra note 24.
61. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 95-4: PROCEDURES FOR
NONCONTROVERSIAL AND EXPEDITED RULEMAKING (1995).
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 4–5.
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iii. Statutory Authorization to Bypass Notice and
Comment Rulemaking
Occasionally, Congress will statutorily authorize or require an
agency to promulgate a permanent rule without using notice and
comment.64 In these cases, the agency usually cites the statute rather
than the APA’s good cause exception provision as its authority to
bypass notice and comment.65 Congress may simply require or
authorize the agency to bypass notice and comment, or may reference
the good cause exception of the APA.66 The GAO analyzed 123
major rules from 2003 to 2010 that were promulgated without notice
and comment and found that 38 of them cited 18 different statutory
authorities either requiring or authorizing agencies to do so.67 The
GAO found that about 70% of the 123 rules involved distributing
federal payments to the public, such as disaster relief and health care
cost reimbursements; foregoing notice and comment expedited the
distribution of funds to beneficiaries.68
Statutory authorization has proven a useful tool in emergencies.
For example, two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks,
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which
created the Transportation Security Administration, led by an
Administrator.69 The statute provides that “if the Administrator
determines that a regulation or security directive must be issued
immediately in order to protect transportation security, the
Administrator shall issue the regulation or security directive without
providing notice or an opportunity for comment and without prior
approval of the Secretary [of Transportation].”70 Further, the GAO
study identified several statutes authorizing agencies to bypass notice

64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 18, 20–21.
65. Id. at 20–21.
66. Compare Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597, 600 (2001) (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2)(A)) (“[T]he Under
Secretary shall issue the regulation . . . without providing notice or an opportunity for
comment . . . .”), with Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127,
§ 5111, 134 Stat. 178, 201 (2020) (to be codified as 29 U.S.C. § 2601 note) (“The
Secretary of Labor shall have the authority to issue regulations for good cause under
sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(A) of title 5, United States Code . . . .”).
67. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 18, 20–
21; see also id. at 3 n.6 (“A major rule is one that, among other things, has resulted in
or is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”).
68. Id. at 21.
69. 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a)–(b)(1).
70. Id. § 114(l)(2)(A).
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and comment to establish climate-related disaster relief programs.71
However, statutory authorization is also used outside the emergency
context — the 2008 Farm Bill required that certain programs be
implemented without notice and comment, resulting in 12 major
rules.72
B. The FFCRA Statute: Creation and Design

Congress statutorily authorized the use of the good cause exception
in the FFCRA.73 Because statutory authorization has become a key
way for Congress to direct agencies to implement emergency relief,
the FFCRA is a crucial case study of the problems that can arise when
Congress explicitly permits an agency to bypass notice and comment
rulemaking and imposes no other procedural requirements to address
the democracy deficit that ensues.74

i. Emergency Paid Sick Leave Was the Product of
Bipartisan Compromise
That the FFCRA was the product of bipartisan compromise makes
it even more troubling that the DOL under then-President Donald J.
Trump would abuse its ability to bypass notice and comment to flout
the plain meaning of the statute and bar some workers from
emergency paid sick leave. Prior to March 2020, there was no
federally guaranteed paid sick time or paid family leave in the United
States, making the U.S. an outlier among countries ranked highly for
economic and human development.75 The COVID-19 pandemic
changed that, prompting the infamously gridlocked U.S. Congress to

71. For example, a rule establishing disaster relief programs to provide hurricane
assistance after four particularly devastating hurricanes in 2005; rules establishing
disaster relief programs for livestock and catfish producers in disaster or emergency
areas during a two-year period; and a rule establishing an assistance program for
livestock, honeybee, and farm-raised fish producers who suffered losses due to
disease or adverse weather such as blizzards and wildfires. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 47–48, 55.
72. Id. at 7; see also id. at 18–19 (featuring a table showing 12 major rules).
73. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134
Stat. 178, 201 (2020).
74. See Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 253, 260 (2017) (explaining that agencies lack the “democratic pedigree”
possessed by Congress and its institutional capacity to channel public values).
75. See HYE JIN RHO, SHAWN FREMSTAD & JARED GABY-BIEGEL, CTR. FOR
ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., CONTAGION NATION 2020: UNITED STATES STILL THE ONLY
WEALTHY NATION WITHOUT PAID SICK LEAVE 3 (2020) (comparing the United States
to 21 other countries with high living standards according to the United Nations’
Human Development Index).
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negotiate bipartisan legislation to address the impending national
crisis. On January 20, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention confirmed the United States’s first COVID-19 case in
Washington State.76 On March 18, 2020, Representative Nita Lowey
of New York introduced the FFCRA.77
On March 12 and 13, 2020, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)
and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin engaged in intense
negotiations, speaking by phone 13 times before reaching a deal.78
Shortly thereafter, then-President Donald J. Trump endorsed the
FFCRA on Twitter, specifically the paid sick leave provision, and
encouraged all Republicans and Democrats to vote for it.79 In the
early hours of March 14, 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the FFCRA with overwhelming bipartisan support.80 House
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) offered rare praise of
76. See Morning Edition, 1st Case of Coronavirus Confirmed in Washington
State, NPR (Jan. 22, 2020, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798392221/1st-us-case-of-coronavirus-confirmed-in-washington-state [https://perma.cc/NQ8Y-P256].
But see Jaclyn Diaz, Coronavirus Was in U.S. Weeks Earlier Than Previously
Known,
Study
Says,
NPR
(Dec.
1,
2020,
2:50
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/12/01/940395651/coronavirus-was-in-u-s-weeks-earlier-than-previouslyknown-study-says [https://perma.cc/QDZ7-AW84].
77. See H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. (2020).
78. Erica Werner et al., House Passes Coronavirus Economic Relief Package with
Trump’s Support, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/uspolicy/2020/03/13/paid-leave-democrats-trump-deal-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/5NB9-ZVLY].
79. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2020, 8:42 PM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22%5C%22free+coronavirus+tests
%5C%22%22 [https://perma.cc/3293-ZFAG] (“I fully support H.R. 6201: Families
First CoronaVirus Response Act, which will be voted on in the House this evening.
This bill will follow my direction for free CoronaVirus tests, and paid sick leave for
our impacted American Workers. I have directed . . . . ”); Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2020, 8:42 PM), https://www.
thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22I+encourage+all+Republicans+and+Democra
ts+to+come+together+and+VOTE+YES%21%22
[https://perma.cc/7GD3-Z56S]
(“ . . . the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations
that will provide flexibility so that in no way will Small Businesses be hurt. I
encourage all Republicans and Democrats to come together and VOTE YES! I will
always put . . . . ”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 8:42
PM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22being+of+
American+families+FIRST.+%22 [https://perma.cc/U7UH-557F] (“ . . . the health
and well-being of American families FIRST. Look forward to signing the final Bill,
ASAP!”).
80. The House of Representatives passed the FFCRA 363-40: 223 Democrats and
140 Republicans were in favor, 40 Republicans opposed; nine Democrats and 17
Republicans did not vote. Roll Call 102/Bill Number: H.R. 6201, U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES
CLERK
(Mar.
14,
2020,
12:51
AM),
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2020102 [https://perma.cc/GA8G-KMXG].
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Speaker Pelosi for inviting House Republicans to “come together to
put the American public first.”81 Then-President Trump again took
to Twitter to praise the “[g]ood teamwork between Republicans &
Democrats” in passing the FFCRA.82
Two amendments that were proposed, but ultimately failed,
demonstrate the truly bipartisan nature of the final bill. On March
18, 2020, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) proposed an amendment
that would have provided protected paid sick time to employees
nationwide for themselves or to care for a sick family member or
child; employees would have earned one hour of paid sick time for
every 30 hours worked, and the employer would have been
reimbursed by the Treasury Department for the wages paid to the
individual using such leave in 2020 and 2021.83 The amendment failed
along party lines with all Democrats in favor and all Republicans
opposed.84 Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI) proposed an amendment
that would have stricken emergency paid sick leave and family leave
and the attendant tax credit in their entirety but would have instituted
a tax credit for state-provided unemployment insurance to those who
could not work due to the same COVID-19-related reasons as
provided for in the original bill.85 The amendment failed, nearly
along party lines.86 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Senate passed the
FFCRA almost unanimously.87 President Trump signed the FFCRA
into law later that day.88

81. Werner et al., supra note 78.
82. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 14, 2020, 7:37 AM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22good+teamwork%22
[https://perma.cc/798G-QDMF].
83. 166 CONG. REC. S1, 808–810 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2020) (SA 1559 Title I Sec.
201(b)(1), Title III Sec. 302(a)(1)(A)).
84. Roll Call Vote 116th Congress — 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (Mar. 18, 2020,
2:05
PM),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
=116&session=2&vote=00074 [https://perma.cc/XC3E-W2S6].
85. 166 CONG. REC. S1,808 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2020).
86. Forty-eight Republicans and two Democrats were in favor, 45 Democrats and
three Republicans were opposed; two Republicans did not vote. Roll Call Vote 116th
Congress — 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (Mar. 18, 2020, 2:53 PM),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
=116&session=2&vote=00075 [https://perma.cc/G8A9-R3UT].
87. The Senate passed the FFCRA 90-8; the eight Nays were Republicans, and
two Republicans did not vote. Roll Call Vote 116th Congress — 2nd Session, U.S.
SENATE (Mar. 18, 2020, 3:32 PM), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&session=2&vote=00076
[https://perma.cc/J4M3-3RRY].
88. H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. (2020).
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ii. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act
The FFCRA contained two acts related to emergency leave: the
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (EPSLA), which provided eligible
U.S. workers with two weeks of emergency paid sick leave should
they or someone in their household receive a quarantine order due to
the COVID-19 disease, and the Emergency Family Medical Leave
Expansion Act (Expanded FMLA), which expanded the Family
Medical Leave Act to allow parents to take leave due to COVID-19related school and childcare closures.89 While employers were
required to provide paid leave upfront, the federal government
footed the bill: employers could claim a tax credit equivalent to 100%
of the qualified sick and family leave wages paid.90
The EPSLA provided for 80 hours — two five-day, 40-hour work
weeks — of paid sick leave for full-time employees who were unable
to work due to at least one of six qualifying reasons related to
COVID-19: (1) the employee was subject to a government-issued
quarantine or isolation order; (2) a health care provider advised the
employee to self-quarantine; (3) the employee was symptomatic and
seeking a diagnosis; (4) the employee was caring for someone who
falls under (1) or (2); (5) the employee was caring for their child
whose place of care was closed; or (6) the employee was experiencing
“any other substantially similar condition” specified by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services in consultation with the DOL and
Treasury Department.91 Emergency paid sick leave was limited to ten
days because, according to one critic, “Republican leadership in the
House and Senate didn’t want to set a precedent” that could fuel
momentum for a national paid leave policy.92
Expanded FMLA created an additional reason why an employee
could take ten weeks of paid leave under the 1993 Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) if they were:
[U]nable to work (or telework) due to a need for leave to care for
the son or daughter under 18 years of age of such employee if the
school or place of care has been closed, or the child care provider of

89. See generally Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127,
§§ 3101–106, 5101–111, 134 Stat. 178, 189–92, 195–201 (2020).
90. See id. §§ 7001(a), 7003(a), 134 Stat. at 210, 214.
91. See id. §§ 5102(a)–(b). Part-time workers were entitled to the average number
of hours they worked over a typical two-week period. Id. § 5102(b)(2)(B).
92. See Steven Findlay, Congress Left Big Gaps in the Paid Sick Days and Paid
Leave Provisions of the Coronavirus Emergency Legislation, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200424.223002/full/
[https://perma.cc/84AD-3EJR].
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such son or daughter is unavailable, due to a public health
emergency.93

This family leave could be combined with emergency paid sick leave
for a total of 12 weeks of leave.
Because the FFCRA resulted from genuine political compromise,
it already contained significant exceptions before the DOL exceeded
the bounds of the statute to bar even more U.S. workers from
accessing leave. The first major exception was based on employer
size. While all public employers were subject to the FFCRA, private
employers with 500 or more employees were not.94 In 2020,
approximately 59.7 million individuals worked for private-sector
employers that employed 500 or more employees, thus the FFCRA
excluded nearly 48% of the private sector workforce.95
The
justification was that large companies already offer paid leave and
therefore did not require a federal tax subsidy.96 The DOL later
estimated that in March 2020, 88% of private industry workers at
establishments with 500 or more employees had access to paid sick
leave.97 However, it is unlikely that this group had access to the paid
sick leave equivalent of what the FFCRA guaranteed; about twothirds of employees with paid sick leave accrue a fixed number of
paid sick days per year, and only 28% of that group have 10 to 14
days after one year of service.98 Further, 79% of employees with paid
sick leave either cannot carry over unused sick days to future years or
are limited; in the private sector, the median cap is 20 days.99 Finally,
access to paid sick leave differs drastically across the income

93. Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 3102.
94. See id. § 5110(2)(B)(i)(I)(aa), 134 Stat. at 199.
95. See Table F: Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size Class:
1993/Q1 Through 2019/Q1, Not Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_f.txt [https://perma.cc/N64M-2295] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2021).
96. See Findlay, supra note 92.
97. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., USDL-20-1792, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED
STATES
—
MARCH
2020
3
(2020)
[hereinafter
USDL-20-1792],
https://perma.cc/CWW3-KJPC. Notably, DOL released these estimates immediately
following the New York Attorney General’s successful lawsuit challenging the DOL’s
underinclusive implementation of the FFCRA, a damning report by the DOL’s
Office of the Inspector General, and the DOL’s revision of its regulations, and
therefore may be seen as an attempt to retroactively justify the DOL’s actions. See
infra Section I.C.
98. Drew DeSilver, As Coronavirus Spreads, Which U.S. Workers Have Paid Sick
Leave — And Which Don’t?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/12/as-coronavirus-spreads-which-u-sworkers-have-paid-sick-leave-and-which-dont/ [https://perma.cc/57UE-9EXZ].
99. Id.
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spectrum; it is “nearly universal at the upper ends of the wage
distribution” and “becomes scarcer the less money one makes.”100
The FFCRA also provided that employers with fewer than 50
employees could claim an exemption “when the imposition of such
requirements would jeopardize the viability of the business as a going
concern.”101 In 2020, 33.8 million individuals, or approximately 27%
of the private-sector workforce, worked for employers with fewer
than 50 employees.102 The DOL estimated that in March 2020, 67%
of private industry workers employed by small businesses had access
to paid sick leave.103 This carve-out likely sought to protect small
businesses from a large and sudden cost while the U.S. economy was
in freefall, but critics point out that such a cost was only upfront
because the federal government would reimburse firms for the leave
provided via a tax credit.104
The compromises congressional Republicans obtained limited the
scope of COVID-19-related paid sick leave, though congressional
Democrats still sought to fill the gaps in the FFCRA. On May 15,
2020, the House passed the HEROES Act, which would have
expanded the FFCRA to employers with 500 or more employees and
removed the health care provider exemption.105 The bill died in the
Republican-controlled Senate.106 Despite the election of President
Joseph R. Biden and the Democrats narrowly winning back the
Senate, Democrats did not prioritize preserving or expanding
emergency paid family and sick leave. This is evident in the FFCRA’s
eventual extension. As originally designed, the mandate that

100. Id. 92% of workers in the top quarter of earnings (making more than $32.21
per hour) had access to some form of paid sick leave in 2019, compared to just 31%
of workers in the lowest-earning tenth (making $10.80 per hour or less). Id.
101. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 3102,
5111(2), 134 Stat. 178, 189, 201 (2020); see also Families First Coronavirus Response
Act: Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP’T LAB. [hereinafter FFCRA Q&A, U.S. DEP’T
OF
LAB.],
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra-questions#58
[https://perma.cc/F2ST-TX42] (last visited Nov. 7, 2021) (explaining when “small
business exemption apply to exclude a small business from the provisions of the
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act and Emergency Family and Medical Leave
Expansion Act”).
102. See Table F: Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size Class:
1993/Q1 Through 2019/Q1, supra note 95.
103. See USDL-20-1792, supra note 97, at 18.
104. See Findlay, supra note 92.
105. See H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. (2020).
106. Id.; see also Long & Rae, supra note 15.
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employers provide this leave expired on December 31, 2020.107
However, on December 27, 2020, Congress amended the FFCRA to
allow employers to voluntarily provide leave through March 31, 2021,
and still receive the attendant tax credit.108 President Biden’s
COVID-19 “American Rescue Plan” had initially proposed
reinstating mandatory leave through the end of September 2021, but
the final version of the stimulus package merely extended optional
leave through September 30, 2021.109

iii. The Health Care Providers and First Responders Exception
The FFCRA also provided that “[a]n employer of an employee
who is a health care provider or an emergency responder may elect to
exclude such employee” from emergency paid sick leave and
Expanded FMLA.110 In defining “health care provider,” the FFCRA
adopted the 1993 FMLA definition.111 The FMLA defines “health
care provider” as “a doctor of medicine or osteopathy” authorized to
practice by a State or “any other person determined by the Secretary
[of Labor] to be capable of providing health care services.”112 The
FFCRA’s “health care provider” exception was perhaps justified by
the essential nature of health care services during the pandemic and
this group’s existing access to leave.113 The FFCRA was not the only
paid sick leave option for health care workers; the DOL estimated
that 84% of health care and social assistance employees in the private

107. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 3102(a)(1),
5109, 134 Stat. 178, 189, 198 (2020). See generally FFCRA Q&A, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
supra note 101.
108. See FFCRA Q&A, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 101.
109. See H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. (2021); see also Evandro C. Gigante et al.,
Congress Passes American Rescue Plan: What Employers Need to Know, NAT’L L.
REV. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passesamerican-rescue-plan-what-employers-need-to-know
[https://perma.cc/SYL2BGMT]; Tami Luhby & Katie Lobosco, Here’s What’s in the Senate Stimulus Plan,
CNN (Mar. 6, 2021, 4:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/04/politics/stimulussenate-democrats-proposal/index.html [https://perma.cc/QNE3-ZJJR].
110. Families First Coronavirus Response Act §§ 3105, 5102(a).
111. See id. § 5110(4).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(6).
113. No member of Congress justified or criticized exempting health care providers
from emergency paid sick leave on the record while the FFCRA was being debated
from March 13–18, 2020. See generally 166 CONG. REC. H1,687 (2020). Senator
Charles Schumer (D-NY) came the closest when he stated, “[p]ublic health officials
and researchers and doctors on the frontlines must continue to do the difficult and
noble work they are now engaged in” while “[t]he American people must hunker
down.” 116 CONG. REC. S1,749 (2020) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer).
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industry had access to paid sick leave.114 However, while most health
care employers already offered paid sick leave, such leave usually
requires accrual and therefore did not guarantee ten days of
quarantine leave, as the FFCRA did.115

iv. Congress Statutorily Authorized Rule Promulgation
Without Notice and Comment
Recognizing the need to make paid leave accessible to U.S.
workers immediately, Congress statutorily authorized the DOL to
bypass notice and comment rulemaking procedures to implement the
FFCRA. The FFCRA provides that the DOL “shall have the
authority to issue regulations for good cause” under the APA “to
exclude certain health care providers and emergency responders from
the definition of employee” under the FFCRA, “including by
allowing the employer of such health care providers and emergency
responders to opt out.”116 However, the need for an immediately
effective rule created the risk of a bad one. By explicitly authorizing
the DOL to invoke the good cause exception, Congress protected the
DOL from a procedural challenge on those grounds, even if the rule
“offered little in substance to protect American families from
economic harm resulting from COVID-19.”117 Though, at least one
commentator has recognized that had Congress not authorized the
use of the good cause exception, the DOL probably would have been
entitled to use it anyway.118
C. The FFCRA Regulation: Implementation, Legal Challenge,
and Revision

Shortly after Congress passed the FFCRA, the DOL invoked its
statutory authority to implement the law without notice and
comment.119 The DOL’s overly-broad definition of a “health care
provider” received heavy criticism from Congress and the interested
public.120 However, because of Congress’s statutory authorization to
use the good cause exception, the only formal venue to challenge the

114. See USDL-20-1792, supra note 97, at 18.
115. See Long & Rae, supra note 15.
116. Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 5111(1) (emphasis added).
117. See Hartnett, supra note 24.
118. See id.
119. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg.
19,326, 19,342 (Apr. 6, 2020).
120. See infra Section I.C.i.
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DOL’s rule was in federal court, which the New York Attorney
General did successfully.121 As a result, the DOL revised its rule in
September 2020, after six months of erroneously curtailing workers’
ability to access paid sick leave.122

i. The DOL’s Initial Implementation of the FFCRA
and Early Critiques
Because Congress statutorily authorized the use of the good cause
exception, the DOL was able to act extraordinarily quickly to
implement the FFCRA with a binding regulation. On April 6, 2020,
the DOL published a Final Rule implementing the FFCRA, effective
April 2, 2020.123 The DOL invoked its authority under both the APA
and the FFCRA to bypass notice and comment, explaining that it
sought to “avoid economic harm to American families” facing
“difficult choices in balancing work, child care, and the need to seek
medical attention for illness caused by the virus.”124 Notice and
comment rulemaking “would likely delay final action on this matter
by weeks or months, and would, therefore, complicate and likely
preclude the [DOL] from successfully exercising the authority created
by” the FFCRA.125 Finally, the DOL recognized that delaying
implementation of the FFCRA would run counter to FFCRA’s main
purpose of “enabling employees to leave the workplace now to help
prevent the spread of COVID-19.”126 However, because the rule’s
creation was so rushed, on April 10, 2020, the DOL made minor
amendments, effective on that day.127 The April Rule defined “health
care provider” for the purposes of the exemption extremely
broadly.128 For example, “an English professor, librarian, or cafeteria

121. See infra Section I.C.ii.
122. See infra Section I.C.iii.
123. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg.
at 19,326.
124. See id. at 19,342.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg.
20,156 (Apr. 10, 2020).
128. The April Rule defined “health care provider” accordingly:
(i) For the purposes of this definition Employees who may be exempted
from Paid Sick Leave or Expanded Family and Medical Leave by their
Employer under the FFCRA, a health care provider is anyone employed at
any doctor’s office, hospital, health care center, clinic, post-secondary
educational institution offering health care instruction, medical school, local
health department or agency, nursing facility, retirement facility, nursing
home, home health care provider, any facility that performs laboratory or
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manager at a university with a medical school would all be ‘health
care providers’ under the Rule.”129
The April Rule was strongly criticized by Congress and former
government officials almost immediately after it was implemented.
On the day the rule went into effect, two members of Congress sent a
letter to then-Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia explaining that the
overbroad health care provider exemption “violate[d] congressional
intent” and providing the appropriate interpretation.130 In addition,
three former Obama-era DOL officials characterized the Trump
Administration’s DOL as working “aggressively to restrict benefits
that Congress clearly intended to provide” in its implementation of
the FFCRA.131 In their view, the FFCRA’s health care provider
exception was narrow, and the DOL had taken advantage to overbroaden it: “[T]he cashier in a hospital gift shop or even a contractor
that provides payroll processing for a medical school could be denied

medical testing, pharmacy, or any similar institution, Employer, or entity.
This includes any permanent or temporary institution, facility, location, or
site where medical services are provided that are similar to such institutions.
(ii) This definition includes any individual employed by an entity that
contracts with any of these institutions described above to provide services
or to maintain the operation of the facility where that individual’s services
support the operation of the facility. This also includes anyone employed by
any entity that provides medical services, produces medical products, or is
otherwise involved in the making of COVID-19 related medical equipment,
tests, drugs, vaccines, diagnostic vehicles, or treatments. This also includes
any individual that the highest official of a State or territory, including the
District of Columbia, determines is a health care provider necessary for that
State’s or territory’s or the District of Columbia’s response to COVID-19.
(iii) Application limited to leave under the EPSLA and the EFMLEA. The
definition of “health care provider” contained in this subsection applies only
for the purpose of determining whether an Employer may elect to exclude
an Employee from taking leave under the EPSLA and/or the EFMLEA,
and does not otherwise apply for purposes of the FMLA or section
5102(A)(2) of the EPSLA.”).
See id. at 19,351 § 826.30(c)(1).
129. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); see
also Complaint at 17–18, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 20 Civ. 3020), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137116.
130. Letter from Patty Murray, U.S. Sen., & Rosa DeLauro, U.S. Rep., to Eugene
Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Apr. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Murray &
DeLauro Letter].
131. Chris Lu, M. Patricia Smith & David Weil, Why Americans Don’t Know
About Their Right to Paid Sick Leave, NEWSWEEK (May 4, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/why-americans-dont-know-about-their-right-paid-sickleave-opinion-1501532 [https://perma.cc/K3EP-C8QV].

DEMOCRACY DEFICIT

2021]

87

paid sick leave . . . .”132 Still, the DOL did not budge, and the April
Rule remained law.

ii. The N.Y. Attorney General’s Lawsuit and the S.D.N.Y. Decision
While the DOL was unresponsive to these calls for revision, New
York Attorney General Letitia James’s office was listening. On April
14, 2020, Attorney General James sued the DOL in the Southern
District of New York — New York being the only state to do so on
this basis — arguing in part that the DOL’s Final Rule expanded the
term “health care provider” “far beyond both its plain meaning and
the FMLA definition” adopted by the FFCRA, therefore “expos[ing]
millions of American workers to exclusion from emergency family
leave and paid sick leave as authorized by the FFCRA.”133
In New York v. U.S. Department of Labor, S.D.N.Y. Judge Paul
Oetken agreed with New York that the DOL overly restricted access
to leave.134 The court struck down the DOL’s broad definition of
“health care provider” because “the statute unambiguously forecloses
the Final Rule’s definition.”135 The FFCRA’s “broad grant of
authority” to promulgate a rule without notice and comment “is not
limitless.”136 The statute directed the DOL to determine which
employees were capable of providing health care services and
promulgate a regulation excluding them; instead, the DOL’s
definition “hinges entirely on the identity of the employer.”137 The
court noted that even if the statute was ambiguous and it gave
credence to the DOL’s purposive argument –– that a broad definition
exempts employees essential to the healthcare system during the
pandemic –– the DOL’s definition “cannot stand” because it
“includes employees whose roles bear no nexus whatsoever to the
provision of healthcare services, except the identity of their
employers, and who are not even arguably necessary or relevant to
the healthcare system’s vitality.”138 A report by the DOL’s Office of
Inspector General (OIG) published shortly after the ruling also found
that the April Rule “significantly broadened the definition of health
care providers . . . as opposed to the original definition established by

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Complaint, supra note 129.
477 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Id. at 14.

Id.
Id. at 14–15 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
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the FMLA” and recognized this as a major challenge to DOL’s
implementation of the FFCRA.139

iii. The DOL’s September 2020 Rule Revision in Response to the
S.D.N.Y. Decision
Following the S.D.N.Y. decision, the DOL had a range of legal
options, from compliance to obstruction.140 Toward the latter end of
the spectrum, the agency could have tried to render the decision moot
by appealing to the Second Circuit, which could have stayed the
district court ruling until it heard the appeal.141 By running the clock
in this manner, the DOL could have ensured its April Rule would
remain in effect nearly until the FFCRA was originally set to expire,
at the end of 2020.142
Instead, the DOL complied with the decision, revising the Rule on
September 16, 2020 to correct the overly broad health care provider
exception.143 The DOL explained that it opted to revise the definition
in a new emergency rule:
Given the statutory authorization to invoke exemptions from the
usual requirements to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking
and to delay a rule’s effective date, the time-limited nature of the
FFCRA leave benefits, the urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic and
the associated need for FFCRA leave, and the pressing need for
clarity in light of the District Court’s decision.144

The new definition of “health care provider” followed the FMLA
definition, and included any other employee “capable of providing
health care services, meaning he or she is employed to provide
diagnostic services, preventive services, treatment services, or other
services that are integrated with and necessary to the provision of
patient care and, if not provided, would adversely impact patient

139. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 7.
140. See id. at 9 (noting that the DOL reviewed its legal options following the
S.D.N.Y. decision).
141. See Kacie Candela, Federal Family and Sick Leave for Covid-19 Expanded by
New York District Court, BERKE-WEISS L. PLLC (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://www.berkeweisslaw.com/blog/2020/8/13/federal-family-and-sick-leave-forcovid-19-expanded-by-new-york-district-court [https://perma.cc/Z4RE-9H8B].
142. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 3102(a)(1),
5109, 134 Stat. 178, 189, 198 (2020).
143. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,677 (Sept. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826).
144. Id. at 57,678 (citations omitted).
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care.”145 Finally, six months into the pandemic, those whom Congress
intended to cover could access emergency paid leave.
II. THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION: THE DEBATE, ALTERNATIVES,
AND REFORM PROPOSALS

The decision to invoke the good cause exception usually lies with
the agency. Therefore, reviewing courts have developed case law
addressing two key questions: (1) under what circumstances agencies
should invoke the good cause exception, and (2) which standard
courts should use to review this choice.146 However, because
Congress statutorily authorized the DOL to use the good cause
exception to implement the FFCRA, it barred parties and courts from
asking whether the COVID-19 pandemic justified the DOL’s
bypassing notice and comment rulemaking — though few
commentators would disagree that it did.147 Instead, statutory
authorization charts a new line of inquiry: whether eliminating these
first order questions without establishing additional procedural
safeguards unduly risks abuse of agency discretion.
A. The Cases For and Against Using the Good Cause Exception

There are two main perspectives on agencies’ use of the good cause
exception to bypass notice and comment rulemaking: one views the
good cause exception as a crucial mechanism for agency flexibility
when situations demand quick action, and the other is concerned
about the loss of democratic accountability and possible increased
risk of error.148 Both perspectives are crucial to understanding the
benefits and costs of Congress’s decision to statutorily authorize the
DOL to use the good cause exception to implement the FFCRA.

i. The Good Cause Exception Promotes Agency Flexibility and
Enabled the DOL to Implement the FFCRA Quickly
One perspective on the good cause exception recognizes that the
limitations of notice and comment rulemaking –– particularly the slow
speed and high cost –– outweigh its benefits in emergency situations,
during which agencies need to act quickly. While the good cause
exception has legitimate non-emergency uses, the key justification for

145. Id. at 57,690 (quoting Families First Coronavirus Response Act §
826.30(c)(1)(B)).
146. See generally Hartnett, supra note 24.
147. See id. at 1576; see also supra Sections I.B.iv, I.C.ii.
148. See infra Sections II.A.i–ii.
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its existence is that “the time necessary to solicit and evaluate public
comments may foreclose government’s ability to react swiftly,”
especially to “fast-moving events.”149
Supporters of the good cause exception also note that it would be
very difficult for Congress to write a “comprehensive and prescriptive
statutory definition” limiting its use in such a way that achieves the
desired effect across all agencies.150 Therefore, Congress should “rely
more extensively on agency-specific requirements than on generally
applicable requirements like the APA.”151 However, the FFCRA
demonstrates that Congress is willing to and can speak directly on
which rulemaking procedures shall be used to implement an
emergency statute, despite going no further than authorizing the
DOL to bypass notice and comment.
In practice, Congress’s willingness to authorize the use of the good
cause exception allowed the DOL to act even more quickly and with
more flexibility than if Congress had left the DOL to invoke the good
cause exception itself or set a deadline for the DOL to promulgate a
rule. Agencies risk litigation by invoking the good cause exception
without further statutory authorization: one scholar found that from
1995 to 2012, agencies prevailed in their decision to invoke the APA’s
good cause exception in 67% of cases.152 Sometimes agencies point to
tight congressional deadlines to justify the invocation of the good
cause exception, with mixed results.153 In the late 1970s, Congress put
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on a strict timetable to
promulgate rules about air quality standards.154 After missing the
deadline by one month, the EPA issued a final rule without notice
and comment, effective immediately, and invoked the good cause
exception on the grounds that Congress’s deadline rendered notice
and comment impracticable.155
The EPA then sought postpromulgation comments for 60 days and changed the rule in response
to comments received.156 Still, by one author’s estimation, the EPA

149. Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s “Good Cause”
Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 115–18 (1984); see also United States v.
Valverde, 628 F. 3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The good cause exception is
essentially an emergency procedure.” (quoting Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d
352, 357 (9th Cir. 1982))).
150. Raso, supra note 25, at 121–22.
151. Id. at 124.
152. See id. at 90.
153. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 20–21.
154. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 125–26.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 126–27.
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faced at least 42 challenges in ten circuits to its invocation of the good
cause exception, and courts in five circuits sustained these
challenges.157
While this example is distinguishable from the
monumental national emergency the FFCRA aimed to address, it
demonstrates the potential cascade of litigation Congress shielded the
DOL from by not setting a deadline and instead statutorily
authorizing rule promulgation without notice and comment.
The argument for agency flexibility and swift action is supported by
studies showing that, simply, the FFCRA worked. Despite the DOL’s
initial underinclusive implementation, recent empirical evidence
shows that the FFCRA was effective at encouraging sick people to
stay home, thus slowing the spread of COVID-19. One study
analyzing cell phone data found that the FFCRA increased the
average number of hours at home, thereby reducing the share of
individuals likely at work.158 Another study found that in states
where employees gained access to paid sick leave through the
FFCRA — because these states lacked state-level paid sick leave —
there were 400 fewer confirmed cases per state per day and that
therefore it did help “flatten the curve.”159 However, this study notes
that the benefit might have been limited to the short term because
employees who took their finite leave as a precaution were unable to
access it later in the pandemic, forcing them to work while sick and
potentially spread the virus.160

ii. The Good Cause Exception Undermines Democratic Participation
and Agency Accountability and Deprived the DOL of
Valuable Information
The other major view of agency decision making sees bypassing
notice and comment as undermining important rule of law values,
such as “promoting public deliberation in the rulemaking process,
guarding against agency arbitrariness, making agencies accountable
both to the public and to Congress, and providing valuable

157. See id. at 126–28.
158. See Martin Andersen et al., Paid Sick-Leave and Physical Mobility: Evidence
from the United States During a Pandemic (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 27138, 2020).
159. See Stefan Pichler, Katherine Wen & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, COVID-19
Emergency Sick Leave Has Helped Flatten the Curve in the United States, 39
HEALTH AFFS. 2197, 2202 (2020).
160. See id. at 2203 (noting that in times of economic hardship, when employees
are afraid of losing their jobs, employees who already exhausted their finite leave are
at a heightened risk of choosing to work sick and potentially spread the COVID-19
virus).
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information.”161 It is widely recognized that notice and comment
rulemaking helps to “reconcile agencies’ democratic deficit with their
immense power,”162 legitimizing government bodies whose decision
making power was delegated by Congress and not derived directly
from the electorate.163
Notice and comment rulemaking also has important practical
benefits, such as promoting “accurate, well-informed decisionmaking
and participant satisfaction with the way government operates.”164
The agency benefits by receiving information from interested parties
that aid it in sensible rulemaking, and the public benefits from the
opportunity to have a direct say in the regulations that will affect
them.165 Had the DOL engaged in a post-promulgation comment
period for the FFCRA, it would have gathered information that could
have helped it make better decisions about how best to allocate its
funding for enforcement and outreach. A report by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics shows that the pandemic caused about 14% of
businesses to increase the amount of paid sick leave they offer their
employees since the beginning of 2020.166 While it is possible that the
FFCRA helped normalize paid sick leave, it may also be the case that
employers began offering paid sick leave because they did not know
they could receive a tax credit for doing so through the statute.
The DOL OIG conducted an investigation in August 2020 and
found the agency enforcement and outreach efforts to be directionless
and lacking.167 For example, the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division had
established a workgroup to oversee FFCRA-related education and
outreach efforts comprised of experts in policy, compliance,
communications, enforcement, training, and data analytics.168
However, the OIG investigation found that the DOL lacked a

161. Raso, supra note 25, at 67.
162. Bagley, supra note 74, at 260.
163. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 116–17; see also Michael Asimow, InterimFinal Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 708 (1999).
164. Jordan, supra note 149, at 115.
165. See id. at 116.
166. There was a rough correlation between offering paid sick leave and
government shutdown orders: utilities, which almost never closed, led the pack,
whereas arts and educational institutions suffered widespread shutdowns and were
the least likely to have expanded paid sick leave. See Tim Ryan, Pandemic Led 14%
of Biz Locations to Boost Paid Sick Leave, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2020, 3:49 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1335296/pandemic-led-14-of-biz-locations-to-boostpaid-sick-leave [https://perma.cc/JF7T-MVPC].
167. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 10–11.
168. See id. at 10.

2021]

DEMOCRACY DEFICIT

93

strategy for this working group’s efforts.169 It further found that the
DOL had no concrete plans to spend the $2.5 million Congress
allocated it in the June 2020 CARES Act for enforcement and
outreach to educate employers and employees about the FFCRA.170
Notice and comment would have given the public the opportunity to
communicate directly with the DOL on the FFCRA’s implementation
and would have given the agency access to valuable information early
in the pandemic.
Notice and comment is also instrumental in promoting
congressional control over the administrative state; it enables
Congress to gather information, require that agencies examine certain
issues, and determine how certain constituents will be affected by
regulations.171 When agencies invoke the good cause exception,
Congress loses these tools and must rely on other mechanisms of
control, such as oversight hearings, audit and document requests,
commissioning GAO investigations, and writing letters to agency
heads — the last of which was often used following the DOL’s
implementation of the FFCRA.172
However, these tools are
hampered by limited resources, hyper-polarization, and shifting
congressional attention and priorities from election to election.173
Therefore, when agencies invoke the APA’s good cause exception in
its current form, the judiciary is “the only entity that has exercised
meaningful (albeit imperfect) oversight over agency avoidance of
procedural requirements”, though often with slow and unpredictable
results.174 This is also the case when Congress has statutorily
authorized the use of the good cause exception, as in the FFCRA, but
the agency invites a court challenge by promulgating a rule that
blatantly contravenes the statute.
A major critique of the good cause exception, particularly in
emergency situations, is that it increases the risk of error. “[S]ome
rules promulgated under the good cause exemption have been based
on faulty or inadequate information and have produced unanticipated
and undesirable effects. Public participation probably would have led

169. See id. at 10–11.
170. See id.; see also Letter from U.S. Reps. Jimmy Gomez, Rosa DeLauro &
Carolyn Maloney to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Oct. 2, 2020)
[hereinafter Gomez, DeLauro & Maloney Letter].
171. See Raso, supra note 25, at 118–19.
172. See id. at 120–21; see also Murray & DeLauro Letter, supra note 130.
173. See Raso, supra note 25, at 120–21.
174. Id. at 119.

94

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

to better decisions in these cases,”175 and would have increased public
perception of fairness and acceptance of the rule. One generous view
of the April Rule’s erroneously broad definition of a “health care
provider” is that it was such an error. While it is not clear that the
effect of the April Rule — excluding many more U.S. workers from
emergency paid leave than Congress intended –– was sincerely
unanticipated or undesirable to then-Secretary Eugene Scalia’s DOL,
a post-promulgation comment period may have prompted the agency
to revise the rule much sooner than the New York Attorney
General’s lawsuit ultimately did.176
Regardless of whether the April Rule was intentionally overbroad,
the OIG investigation found that while the DOL acted quickly, it
continued to face challenges implementing and enforcing the
FFCRA.177 Most significantly, the report found that the April Rule’s
broader definition for health care providers presented a “major
challenge” to ensuring that “all those who are eligible for FFCRA’s
emergency paid leave benefits [were] able to take advantage of those
benefits.”178 The OIG did not attempt to estimate how many millions
of U.S. workers were erroneously denied leave under the April Rule,
finding only that the estimate of 9 million might be “understated
because it didn’t include all of the occupations in the Department’s
expanded definition for health care provider.”179 The DOL’s ability
to conduct on-site investigations and enforce compliance with the
FFCRA was also hampered by social distancing efforts and the
agency’s remote work policy.180
B. Good Cause Exception and Reform Proposals and Alternatives

To alleviate the democracy deficit caused by bypassing notice and
comment, various alternatives to the federal good cause exception
have been proposed or are already in effect in other contexts.
Scholars have proposed specific reforms to the federal APA’s good
cause exception, such as mandatory post-promulgation comments and

175. James Yates, “Good Cause” Is Cause for Concern, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1438, 1451 (2018).
176. See infra Sections II.B.i–iii.
177. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 2.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 2–3, 9.
180. See id. at 4–6 (explaining that, instead of on-site investigations, all but the
most serious complaints were being investigated remotely, which limits efficiency, or
being resolved through conciliation).
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expiration dates.181
There are also emergency rulemaking
alternatives in use –– with varying degrees of success –– at the federal
and state levels, such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) Emergency Temporary Standards and state
APAs.182
This Note will examine the emergency rulemaking
procedures proposed by scholars, used by OSHA, and set out in the
Model State APA and New York’s and Virginia’s APAs.183

i. Proposals to Reform the Federal APA’s Good Cause Exception
Legal scholars, particularly those who are concerned about the
good cause exception’s democracy deficit, have been proposing
reforms for decades.184 One longtime proposal is to require a
comment period after an emergency rule is promulgated.185
However, one drawback of this model is that the comment period “is
often considered a waste of time by the public, which views the
agency as having made its decision.”186 Additionally, both the agency
and regulated parties may become biased in favor of the emergency
rule.187 At an institutional level, “[t]here are significant risks to our
democratic system where agencies are given a second shot at
explaining away” notice and comment after the rule has been
promulgated.188
One way to overcome the weaknesses of a post-promulgation
comment period is by placing an automatic expiration date on
emergency rules.189
This would limit agencies’ ability to use
emergency rules as permanent solutions and would “make any post-

181.
182.
183.
184.

See infra Section II.B.i.
See infra Sections II.B.i–iii.
See infra Section II.B.iii.
See supra Section II.A.ii; see also Nathanael Paynter, Comment, Flexibility
and Public Participation: Refining the Administrative Procedure Act’s Good Cause
Exception, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 397, 399 (2011) (“[I]n order to limit the power
given to agencies acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, and to protect basic principles
of representative democracy in rulemaking, changes to the good cause exception are
necessary.”); James Kim, Note, For a Good Cause: Reforming the Good Cause

Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1070–71 (2011).
185. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 116, 168.
186. Id. at 171.
187. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1452.
188. Id. at 1452, 1461 (arguing that because of these risks, major rules, which are
rules that have at least $10 million in consequences, should have to undergo prepromulgation notice and comment, with a notable exception for rules that address
“an immediate emergency or risk of emergency to public health, safety, or welfare”).
189. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 171.
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promulgation comment period more productive, since the agency will
have to take further action to review and reissue a final rule for
congressional approval.”190 However, automatic expiration dates may
hurt compliance with the emergency rule; regulated entities will be on
notice that rules may change or disappear, and therefore will be less
likely to voluntarily incur the often high costs associated with
compliance.191 How well firms comply with temporary rules may also
influence whether and how much the agency changes the rule
following the comment period.192
Some scholars have proposed more limited reforms of the good
cause exception. Because generalization beyond what already exists
in the APA would be difficult, Congress could consider creating
agency-specific procedural requirements.193 Another proposal is to
make the good cause exception unavailable for major rules: those
with an economic impact of over $100 million must undergo prepromulgation notice and comment.194

ii. OSHA Emergency Temporary Standards
Mandatory expiration dates on emergency regulations
promulgated without notice and comment is not a novel proposal,
though it has hit some stumbling blocks at the federal level in the
workplace context. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970,195 OSHA has the ability to either promulgate a rule using a
variation of traditional notice and comment under Section 6(b)196 or
issue an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) under Section
6(c).197 The ETS provision empowers OSHA to bypass notice and

190. Id. at 172.
191. See id. at 173–74.
192. See id. at 174.
193. See Raso, supra note 25, at 73.
194. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1445.
195. See generally Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78.
196. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2).
197. See id. § 655(c).
The Secretary shall provide, without regard to the requirements of chapter
5, title 5, Unites States Code, for an emergency temporary standard to take
immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register if he determines
–– (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to
substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from
new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect
employees from such danger. (2) Such standard shall be effective until
superseded by a standard promulgated in accordance with the procedures
prescribed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. (3) Upon publication of such
standard in the Federal Register the Secretary shall commence a proceeding
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comment if the Secretary determines that employees “are exposed to
a grave danger” from exposure to harmful substances, and an ETS is
“necessary to protect employees from such danger.”198 Unlike under
the good cause exception, once an ETS is published, it also serves as
notice for a mandatory post-promulgation comment period.199 The
ETS remains in effect for six months or until a permanent rule
promulgated using notice and comment supersedes it, whichever
comes first.200
OSHA has only issued 11 ETSs since its creation in 1970 and has
only issued two ETS since courts struck down its 1983 ETS on
asbestos.201 Of the first nine issued, only three were unchallenged in
court.202 Of the six that were, four were fully vacated or stayed, and
one was partially vacated.203 Only one challenged ETS survived.204
Of the five cases that were not challenged or that were fully or
partially upheld by the courts, OSHA issued a permanent standard
either within the six months required by the statute or within several
months of the six-month period and always within one year of the
promulgation of the ETS.205

However, after 1980, a combination of court decisions and new
federal laws put additional requirements on OSHA’s rulemaking
procedure that helped disincentivize the use of ETSs.206
Some members of Congress, groups in health care and meat
processing, and workers had hoped OSHA would promulgate an ETS
to address the COVID-19 pandemic.207 At least nine COVID-19
in accordance with section 6(b) of this Act, and the standard as published
shall also serve as a proposed rule for the proceeding. The Secretary shall
promulgate a standard under this paragraph no later than six months after
publication of the emergency standard as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection.

Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86
Fed. Reg. 61,551–54 (Nov. 5, 2021); see also SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA):
EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND COVID-19 6, 27 (2021).
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 6.
206. See id.
207. See id.; see also Letter from Members of Cong. to Kevin McCarthy,
Republican Leader, U.S. House of Reps. (July 14, 2020); Letter from A Better
Balance et al. to U.S. House of Reps. (Apr. 29, 2020).
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relief bills in the 116th Congress would have required OSHA to
promulgate an ETS to address workplace exposure to COVID-19;
this provision ultimately did not make it into the FFCRA or other
COVID-19 relief laws.208 These hopes and efforts were realized in
June 2021, when OSHA issued its first ETS in nearly four decades,
establishing new requirements to protect healthcare workers who are
at high risk of exposure to COVID-19.209 In November 2021, OSHA
issued another COVID-19 ETS, requiring employees with 100 or
more employees to develop, implement, and enforce a mandatory
COVID-19 vaccination policy or an optional vaccination policy with
regular testing and mask-wearing requirements for unvaccinated
employees.210

iii. State Emergency Rule Procedures: The 2010 Model State APA,
New York, and Virginia
In addition to the federal APA, all 50 states have their own state
APAs.211
These state APAs can serve as “laboratories of
democracy,” testing reforms that could be implemented at the federal
level.212 However, state APA emergency procedures are not perfectly
analogizable to the federal APA because state agencies face different
emergencies than federal agencies, such as complying with deadlines
for federal funding.213

208. See SZYMENDERA, supra note 201.
209. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.502, 1910.504–05, 1910.509 (2021); see also Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., US Department of Labor’s OSHA Issues Emergency Temporary
Standard to Protect Healthcare Workers from the Coronavirus (June 10, 2021),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha/osha20210610-0
[https://perma.cc/4ZYA-8R83].
210. See COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 85
Fed. Reg. 61,402, 61,402, 61,551–54 (Nov. 5, 2021).
211. State
Administrative
Procedure
Acts,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_administrative_procedure_acts [https://perma.cc/KR7XU66D] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
212. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”).
213. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 309 (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2010) (permitting the invocation of emergency
rulemaking to prevent “the loss of federal funding for an agency program”); see also
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(B) (2021) (allowing emergency rulemaking when a
federal regulation requires compliance within 280 days or less from its enactment).
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The non-partisan Uniform Law Commission routinely publishes a
Model State APA, most recently in 2010.214 No state has yet enacted
the 2010 Model State APA.215 The 2010 Model State APA’s Section
309 provides that an agency may bypass full notice and comment if it
finds that “an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare
or the loss of federal funding for an agency program requires the
immediate adoption of an emergency rule.”216 The agency must
publish its reasons for such a finding.217 Unlike the federal good
cause exception, Section 309 mandates an expiration date for
emergency rules: 180 days, with the option for a 180-day renewal.218
Adopting an emergency rule does not preclude notice and comment
rulemaking; nor does it prohibit the adoption of a new emergency
rule if “the agency finds that the imminent peril to the public health,
safety, or welfare or the loss of federal funding for an agency program
still exists” when the original emergency rule expires.219
Section 309 was adapted from the 1961 Model State APA and
Virginia’s State APA.220 New York State’s emergency rulemaking
provision is based on the 1961 Model State APA; the former provides
for emergency rule expiration after 90 days, with the option to
readopt the rule for two additional 60-day periods.221 The agency
may readopt the emergency rule once if it has submitted a notice of
proposed rulemaking and may readopt a second time if it has solicited
and assessed public comments.222 Emergency rules addressing
“security authorizations, corporate or financial structures or
reorganization thereof” may be exempted from the expiration
requirement “if the agency finds that the purpose of the rule would be
frustrated if subsequent notice procedures were required.”223 The
agency is not required to engage in a post-promulgation comment
period; however, it must provide notice about whether it intends to
214. See State Administrative Procedure Acts, Revised, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?communitykey=f184fb0c-5e31-4c6d-8228-7f2b0112fa42&tab=groupdetails (last
visited Apr. 15, 2021). The states and jurisdictions that have enacted previous Model
APAs are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, Tennessee, Washington D.C., and Wyoming. Id.
215. See id.
216. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 309.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. § 309 cmt.
221. See id.; see also N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 202(6)(b) (Consol. 2021).
222. See N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 202(6)(e).
223. Id. § 202(6)(c).
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engage in full notice and comment, explain the statutory authority
and reasons for the emergency rule, give the dates the rule will take
effect and expire, provide a regulatory impact statement and
flexibility analysis, and provide the contact information of a
representative who can answer questions about the rule.224
Virginia’s APA statute also contains an emergency rulemaking
provision.225
If an agency believes an emergency situation
necessitates a rule, it must consult with and receive permission from
the Attorney General before promulgation; the Governor has the
final say as to whether the rule is truly necessary.226 When a state or
federal law imposes a deadline of 280 days or less to act, an agency
may propose an emergency rule without consulting the Attorney
General, but the Governor must still approve the rule before it takes
effect.227 Virginia imposes an expiration date on all emergency rules,
albeit a long one: 18 months.228 The agency may issue related
emergency rules within this period, but the clock starts with the first
emergency rule.229 As in New York, the agency must decide
relatively quickly whether it will want to make the emergency rule
permanent; it must publish a notice within 60 days of the emergency
regulation’s effective date, and propose a replacement regulation
within 180 days of the same.230 If the agency tries but fails to adopt a
replacement rule before the emergency rule expires, the Governor
may authorize re-adoption of the emergency rule for a period no
longer than six months.231 The decision to readopt the emergency
rule is not subject to judicial review.232
The Model State APA, New York, and Virginia good cause
provisions offer a variety of alternatives that could be incorporated at
the federal level in emergency and/or agency-specific legislation,
despite the fact that they were designed with the additional purpose
of complying with deadlines imposed by federal regulations and for
federal funding.233
Most importantly, they demonstrate that
procedural safeguards such as a mandatory post-promulgation

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See id. § 202(6)(d).
See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011 (2021).
See id. § 2.2-4011(A).
See id. § 2.2-4011(B).
See id. § 2.2-4011(C).
See id.
See id.
See id. § 2.2-4011(D).
See id.
See supra text accompanying note 213.
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comment period and expiration dates with the limited possibility of
extension can work in practice.
III. A PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY
RULEMAKING WHEN THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION IS
STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED

This Note proposes a series of procedural safeguards when
Congress statutorily authorizes agencies to bypass notice and
comment rulemaking in future emergencies based on lessons learned
from the DOL’s initial erroneous implementation of the FFCRA.
First, Congress should continue to regard statutory authorization as
an effective legislative tool because it succeeded in shielding the DOL
from judicial review of what was truly an “emergency,” which has had
a severe chilling effect on OSHA’s use of ETSs.234 However,
statutory authorization should only be used in true emergencies:
situations in which the depth and breadth of the harm a delay in
rulemaking would cause substantially outweigh the harm of bypassing
notice and comment.235 Congress has already effectuated this
principle in the context of public health emergencies,236 national
security,237 and disaster relief programs.238 This should be Congress’s
guiding principle when crafting future emergency legislation.
When Congress is faced with another true emergency justifying
statutory authorization to bypass traditional notice and comment, it
should mandate a set of procedures that help restore some of the
democratic process that is lost.239 The first procedural safeguard
should be that the emergency rule automatically serves as notice of
proposed rulemaking,240 just as OSHA’s ETSs do.241 Beginning on
the effective date of the emergency rule, the agency should be
required to engage in a 30-day comment period, even if the agency
does not intend to make the emergency rule permanent or is unsure
whether it will do so. A 30-day comment period is the ideal length for
an emergency rule because it is only slightly less than the mean and

234. See SZYMENDERA, supra note 201, at 6, 22.
235. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 115, 118.
236. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134
Stat. 178, 201 (2020) (emphasis added).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70.
238. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 47–48,
55.
239. See Bagley, supra note 74, at 260.
240. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(1)–(3) for what NPRM typically requires.
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(c).
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median comment periods agencies use for non-emergency rules, 39
and 32 days, respectively.242
One critique of this approach is that it is a waste of agency
resources to mandate post-promulgation notice and comment if the
agency intends to let the emergency rule expire, particularly when the
emergency requiring the rule passes quickly.243 Further, if interested
members of the public believe the agency plans to let the rule expire,
they may be disincentivized from commenting because they assume
doing so would be pointless.244 However, even if an emergency rule
will expire, post-promulgation notice and comment serves three other
essential purposes: it (1) helps the agency gather information quickly
and develop expertise about an emergency, which by definition is a
situation where information is scarce and in high demand;245 (2)
addresses the democracy deficit by giving the public a non-judiciary
avenue to criticize an agency’s implementation of an emergency
law;246 and (3) could prompt the agency to beneficially revise the
emergency rule before it expires.247
Congress should also mandate that the emergency rule expire 90
days after the rule becomes effective, unless the agency promulgates a
permanent rule based on comments received during the first 30-day
period.248 This would leave the agency 60 days to review comments
and either promulgate a revised permanent rule or decide to let the
emergency rule expire; either way, the agency should be required to
explain its choice in a concise general statement when the new rule is
promulgated, or the emergency rule expires, whichever comes first.249
The new permanent rule would be subject to judicial review under the

242. See Balla, supra note 45, at 5.
243. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 61.
244. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 171.
245. See Raso, supra note 25, at 118–19; see also Emergency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emergency
[https://perma.cc/P38RLN2F] (last visited May 31, 2021) (defining emergency as “an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action”).
246. See Bagley, supra note 74, at 260; see also Raso, supra note 25, at 118–19.
247. The DOL revised its implementation of the FFCRA three times before the
law’s mandatory provision expired on December 31, 2020. See Paid Leave Under the
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,156 (Apr. 10, 2020); see
also Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,677 (Sept. 16, 2020); Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response
Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,326 (Apr. 6, 2020).
248. See Appendix A (showing examples of expiration dates for emergency rules
at the federal and state levels); see also Jordan, supra note 149, at 171.
249. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods.
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d. Cir. 1977).
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“logical outgrowth” standard, like any other rule.250 However,
because the use of statutory authorization implies that Congress
believes having a quickly-assembled emergency rule is better than
having no rule at all, it is imperative that courts ruling against the
agency on the new permanent rule employ the equitable remedy of
remand without vacatur, which allows the rule to stay in effect while
the agency reconsiders it.251
Congress should allow for one 30-day extension on the expiration
date of the emergency rule if the agency is still reviewing comments
or a permanent rule is pending. The 2010 Model State APA, New
York, and Virginia all allow emergency rule extensions, and New
York’s opportunity for a second extension is premised on whether
comments are solicited and assessed.252 The use of the extension
should not preclude the agency from allowing the rule to expire or
issuing a new permanent rule, but the proposed concise general
statement requirement should still apply. Congress should insulate
the agency’s decision to use the 30-day extension from judicial review,
as Virginia does.253 While doing so removes any incentive for the
agency not to use the extension, judicial review of such a short
extension would undermine agency flexibility and would likely be
moot by the time a court ruled.254 Further, given that 60 days –– the
length of the proposed period between the end of the mandatory
comment period and the expiration of the emergency rule –– is a
relatively brief amount of time to promulgate a permanent rule,
agencies deserve some flexibility to take a little more time to ensure
that the permanent rule is not written hastily or plagued by the same
missteps as the initial emergency rule.255
Congress should also statutorily authorize the agency to revise the
emergency rule without notice and comment as often as needed
during the 90 to 120-day period the rule is in effect. As with the
extension, this will give the agency the flexibility it needs –– and
needed twice during the FFCRA –– to correct errors in rushed

250. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3); see also Veterans Just. Grp., LLC v. Sec’y of
Veterans Affs., 818 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
251. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2013-6, REMAND
WITHOUT VACATUR (2013).
252. See Appendix A; see also REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 309
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010); N.Y. A.P.A. LAW §
202(6)(e) (Consol. 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(D) (2021).
253. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(D) (2021).
254. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 115, 118 (recognizing that agency flexibility is
crucial in an emergency).
255. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1451.
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rules.256 Virginia similarly allows additional emergency regulations as
needed addressing the subject matter of the initial emergency
regulation.257 However, as Virginia does, Congress should clarify that
revisions do not affect the effective date for the comment period,
expiration date, and extension.258
When Congress statutorily
authorized the DOL to implement the FFCRA, it gave the DOL the
authority “to issue regulations for good cause.”259 The DOL ––
reasonably, given the plural “regulations” –– justified its September
2020 revisions by invoking this statutory authorization to bypass
notice and comment rulemaking.260 However, Congress should be
even more explicit in future emergency legislation that revisions are
permitted, especially if it also imposes deadlines for postpromulgation notice and comment procedures, as are recommended
here.
Revisions during the 90 to 120-day emergency rule period present
notice and logical outgrowth issues for a new permanent rule the
agency may promulgate. With a 30-day comment period beginning on
the emergency rule’s effective date, the public will have neither a
meaningful opportunity to comment on any revisions made toward
the end of this period nor any opportunity to comment on revisions
made after.261 However, this is not a cause for concern. Agencies
have good faith reasons to revise an emergency rule after the
comment period but before allowing it to expire or promulgating a
new permanent rule: to correct an error or address an urgent issue
brought to the agency’s attention during the comment period.262
Further, under this proposal, emergency rule revisions would be
subject to the mandatory expiration date.263 Finally, the public will
have the opportunity to comment on the subject matter of the
emergency rule during the 30-day comment period, which allows for
more participation than presently exists.
A valid critique of this proposal is that the deadlines for the
comment period, rule expiration, and extension are all shorter than

256. See id.
257. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(C) (2021).
258. See id.
259. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134
Stat. 178, 201 (2020).
260. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,677 (Sept. 16, 2020).
261. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). See generally United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods.
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d. Cir. 1977).
262. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1451.
263. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 172.
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the analogous deadlines in use at the federal and state levels.264 Such
a strict timeline undermines the critical flexibility that emergency rule
mechanisms are meant to enable.265 However, such a short timeline is
necessary because it would ensure agency accountability faster and
more effectively than judicial review, which is unpredictable and, as
demonstrated by the FFCRA litigation, can take at least six
months.266 Finally, this framework would not undermine the good
cause exception generally because this Note only proposes that the
framework be included in emergency legislation statutorily
authorizing an agency to bypass traditional notice and comment.
Emergencies demand not only swift rules but effective ones. This
framework would avoid what happened with the FFCRA by
preserving agency flexibility during emergencies while ensuring that
the interested public and Congress have the opportunity to formally
engage with the substance of emergency rules.267
These additional procedures would have been effective at ensuring
that the DOL’s implementation of the FFCRA was consistent with
the statute and would have had positive externalities as well. A postpromulgation comment period would have prompted the DOL to
gather information from Congress and interested parties such as trade
associations, workers’ rights groups, unions, business groups, and
health care providers about early stumbling blocks to accessing and
providing leave under the FFCRA, as well as from lawyers scrambling
to advise employees of their rights and employers of their
obligations.268 This information could have caused the DOL to fix the
April Rule’s overly broad health care provider exception at least two
months earlier, in response to comments received when promulgating
a permanent rule following the emergency rule’s expiration after 90
to 120 days.269 Further, given the unprecedented and changing nature
of the COVID-19 pandemic, this information could have given the
DOL a better sense of how best to spend its $2.5 million on outreach
and enforcement and closed at least part of the information gap
caused by remote investigations.270 In short, these procedural
safeguards could have made the FFCRA even more effective and

264. See Appendix A.
265. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 115, 118.
266. See supra Section I.C.
267. See supra Section I.C.
268. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14.
269. See supra Sections I.C.iii, II.B.
270. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 10–11; see
also Gomez, DeLauro & Maloney Letter, supra note 170.
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accessible to U.S. workers during the pandemic, potentially saving
lives.
CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic will eventually end, but future
emergencies will again necessitate agency flexibility and immediately
effective regulations. The story of the FFCRA shows the real risk
that agencies may misuse the ability to promulgate rules without
notice and comment when they are insulated from judicial review of
the decision to do so; agencies may exceed the scope of their
authority, and the concerns of Congress, interested parties, and the
public may go unsolicited and ignored. As the implementation of the
FFCRA demonstrates, the stakes — for democracy and human life ––
are high.
Therefore, Congress should not confer statutory
authorization to bypass notice and comment rulemaking lightly and
should require additional procedures to ensure agency accountability
without sacrificing upfront flexibility. The solution most likely to
strike that balance is a mandatory 30-day post-promulgation
comment period, a 90-day expiration date with the possibility of a
single 30-day extension unless a permanent rule is promulgated, and
the ability to revise the emergency rule without notice and comment
during the rule’s 90- to 120-day term.
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APPENDIX A

Figure 1: Emergency Rulemaking Alternatives to the Good Cause
Exception

Emergency Rule
Expiration

Extension or Renewal
of
Emergency Rule

6 months
OSHA
2010 Model
State APA

(Emergency Rule is notice for
mandatory post-promulgation
comment period)

No renewal

180 days (6 months)

180 days (6 months)

New York State
APA

90 days (3 months)

Virginia State
APA

18 months

(Issuing and
Extending
Emergency Rules
Require Governor’s
Approval)

Notice within 60 days
(2 months)
Replace within 180 days
(6 months)

60 days
(2 months)
(if notice
issued)

60 days
(2 months)
(if comments
solicited and
assessed)

6 months

